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Abstract.  Some firms voluntarily abstain from using child labor, presumably in response to concerns 
about the welfare of overseas child workers.  These firms do not, however, support banning the imports of 
competitors’ products manufactured with child labor.  As an explanation of this seemingly contradictory 
behavior, I consider a setting in which two firms engage in Bertrand competition for consumers who vary 
in the value they place on goods made without child labor.  When the firms differentiate themselves 
according to their labor input, both enjoy greater profits.  If imports using child labor are banned, this 
reduces the profits of both firms.  Similar results can also arise in a many firm setting.  If charitable 
donations to education foundations raise the cost of child labor, this too can arise as a purely profit-
seeking activity by adult labor firms.  Thus, while the adult-labor firms engage in seemingly altruistic 
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1.  Introduction 
 The Fair Labor Association (FLA) was founded in 1999 by member corporations to monitor their 
overseas labor practices.  A major concern for the group is the use of overseas child labor by firms that 
are either based in or sell products in the United States.  The International Labor Organization (2001) 
estimates that over 250 million children work worldwide.  While some estimates suggest that 70 percent 
of these children are employed in agriculture, this still implies that some 75 million children are employed 
in industry (Ashagrie, 1998).  In an effort to reduce child labor, the FLA’s Workplace Code of Conduct 
(1999) states that its members shall not employ anyone “younger than 15 (or 14 where the law of the 
country of manufacture allows) or younger than the age for completing compulsory education in the 
country of manufacture where such age is higher than 15”.  Many FLA members such as Reebok 
International, Nike, and Levi-Strauss also contribute to overseas child welfare programs.  For example, in 
1997, Reebok promised $1 million in assistance to Pakistani education programs which benefit regions in 
which child labor is particularly widespread (Department of Labor, 1997).  Furthermore, these same firms 
seek to distance themselves from business partners who use child labor.  Reebok makes this abundantly 
clear in its Human Rights Production Standards (1999), where it flat out states that “Reebok will not work 
with business partners that use child labor”.   
 This concern for the welfare of child labor is also an impetus for government policy.  One of the 
starkest proposals to combat overseas child labor is Senate Bill 1551, the Child Labor Deterrence Act (or 
the Harkin Bill).  First introduced by Senator Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) in 1992, this bill bans U.S. imports of 
goods produced by children under fifteen.  While this bill has failed repeatedly, more tempered versions 
have succeeded.  One example is the 1997 Sanders Amendment of the Trade Act of 1930, which extended 
the ban on importation of products made with “forced or indentured labor” to include products made with 
“forced or indentured child labor”.  Another is the recently approved Harkin Child Labor Amendment 
which made the elimination of only the “worst forms of child labor” a major goal of future U.S. trade 
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negotiations.1, 2  One reason for the continued failure of the Harkin Bill banning imports using any type of 
child labor is that it has faced opposition by adult labor firms as well as the overseas child labor-using 
firms.  For example, the Oriental Rug Importers Association, Inc. (ORIA) proclaims on its website that it 
“is absolutely opposed to the use of illegal child labor and, accordingly, our members have taken 
affirmative steps to avoid the procurement of carpets made with illegal child labor” (ORIA, 2002).  At the 
same time, it also boasts that the organization’s lobbying efforts “successfully opposed the Harkin 
Legislation”.3  Similarly, although it was formed after the earliest incarnations of the Harkin Bill, the 
FLA has remained curiously silent on the Harkin Bill and its offshoots. 
 This silence is surprising on two counts.  First, since these firms presumably abstain from the use 
of child labor out of a belief that child labor is detrimental to the employees (an issue that is by no means 
resolved as discussed in Basu, 1999), one would expect them to favor such a proposal for altruistic 
reasons.  Second, since these firms compete against the low-cost child labor firms, such a ban would 
eliminate their low-cost competitors.  While there is little solid data on how many imports are produced 
with child labor, anecdotal evidence suggests that a significant part of child labor in developing countries 
is devoted towards exports to developed nations.  For example, of the rugs hand-knotted in Bangladesh, 
an industry that traditionally uses child workers, approximately 60 percent of the output is bound for U.S. 
markets (Collingsworth, 1997).  Thus, a ban on child labor imports would presumably also benefit these 
firms’ bottom lines, a boon noted by Basu (1999) among others.  Despite this, adult labor-using firms 
either withhold support or actively fight proposed bans on child labor.  Krueger (1997) even finds 
                                                          
 1 It is worth noting that of the twenty-four detention orders placed against child slavery products 
between 1991 and 2001, only six of these actually resulted in a ban (Sanders, 2001). 
 2 The worst forms of child labor only covers child slavery, child pornography, trafficking in 
children, and the use of children in hazardous occupations (Harkin, 2002).  Dessy and Pallage (2002) and 
Swinnerton and Rogers (2002) discuss the effect of banning the worst kinds of child labor on children. 
 3 The specific locations of these quotes are respectively http://www.oria.org/policy1.htm and 
http://www.oria.org/membership.htm. 
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empirical evidence of this resistance by examining the voting records of congressional representatives on 
the early versions of the Child Labor Deterrence Act.  Surprisingly, he finds that the representatives of 
low-skill districts are least likely to vote in favor of the Harkin Bill even though their constituents are 
most likely to be in competition against the low-wage foreign child workers.  Similarly, the Canadian 
Labor Congress’s (CLC) Mike Desautels has stated that the CLC would not support banning Canadian 
imports of child labor products (Yanz and Jeffcott, 1998). 
 In this paper, I resolve this apparent contradiction by showing that the use of adult labor can arise 
not from concern for child workers, but rather from simple profit-seeking.  If some consumers prefer 
products made without child labor, adult labor firms can differentiate themselves by their production 
methods.  Thus, even though products may have identical physical attributes, by segmenting the market 
along this dimension, firms engaging in price competition can earn greater profits.  Since this “production 
differentiation” can benefit all firms, neither the adult nor the child labor firms would seek to have it 
eliminated.  In interviews, Harkin himself has suggested production differentiation as a reason for firms to 
abstain from child labor.  For example, in a 1997 interview, he notes that firms “are now starting to use 
[child labor-free production] as a marketing tool.  They are actually using it in advertising and in 
marketing to say that our clothes or our products… are not made with child labor” (Israeli Embassy 
Publications, 1997, pg. 3).  He believes that this strategy will be successful because “polls all indicate that 
the vast majority of consumers would purchase and would spend that something extra if they knew that 
the product was not made with child labor” (ibid.).  Even if one doubts that the vast majority of 
consumers are willing to do so, the continued existence of such products demonstrates that at least some 
consumers are willing to pay more for child labor-free products.  To get an idea of how many consumers 
may have preferences based on production methods, consider Haq (1996), who reports that a poll of 
American consumers found that 84 percent would be willing to pay an additional $1 for a $20 garment if 
it were made without sweatshop labor.  Similarly, so-called “fair trade” cocoa which is made without 
child labor or destructive environmental processes sells for as much as 30 percent more than standard 
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cocoa (Pellizzari, 2002).  With this in mind, it is reasonable to suppose that some portion of consumers 
would be willing to pay more for goods made without child labor. 
 Within this production differentiation framework, it is also possible to attribute charitable 
donations by adult labor firms to profit seeking.  If donations serve to improve schooling (or at least 
increase the mandatory length of it), this can increase the cost of child labor and increase the adult labor 
firm’s profits.  Similarly, we might expect that adult labor firms would support a tariff against child-labor 
products even if they do not support a full ban.  This is an interesting insight when considering that 
although the ban of the Harkin Bill has repeatedly failed, there has been some success at making 
preferential trade relations contingent upon labor issues including the use of child labor.  In the U.S., the 
Trade and Development Act of 2000 sought to deny normal trade relations to countries that fail to meet 
and effectively enforce the ILO Convention 182 which bans the “worst forms of child labor”.   This idea 
has been pushed even further by using the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) to revoke normal 
trade relations for developing countries that are not making satisfactory efforts to correct poor labor 
standards.  Similarly, the European Union introduced labor standards into its GSP in 1998.4  This 
argument was also used by Rodrik (1995) who suggests that if a nation on the whole views poor overseas 
labor standards as serious problem, then protectionist measures may be warranted. 
 One final implication of the production differentiation model is that in order to actually eliminate 
child labor, it may not be sufficient to rely solely on industry groups like the FLA.  In fact, concern over 
the corporate membership in the FLA gave rise to the alternative Worker’s Rights Consortium (WRC) in 
early 2000.  This second organization specifically does not include corporations in its leadership.  Thus, 
whereas the FLA may be effective in some labor issues, the production differentiation analysis suggests 
that there may indeed be a role in the child labor debate for non-industry groups like the WRC.   
                                                          
 4 See Stern (forthcoming) for details about both of these policies and their effect on overseas 
labor practices. 
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 Before continuing I want to discuss the differences between my results and those of Basu, Chau, 
and Grote (2000) who focus on the impact of potentially-false labeling schemes on trade, child labor, and 
welfare.  In their model, a Northern country produces only using adult labor.  This country imports from 
the South, where production methods are unobservable and can use either adult or child labor.   The 
Northern consumers have identical and constant marginal rates of substitution between child and adult 
labor products (compare this to my consumer heterogeneity).  Because of production method uncertainty, 
consumers are willing to pay a premium for Northern goods since by virtue of country of origin 
information there is a de facto labeling scheme in place.  Production method labeling of imports reduces 
the uncertainty in buying Southern products, thus Northern adult labor firms lose from labeling while 
Southern adult labor firms gain.  Furthermore, since they assume price-taking firms, a tariff on unlabeled 
imports can induce Southern firms to switch to adult labor products, also hurting Northern firms.  My 
model of production differentiation under Bertrand competition, however, finds that Northern adult labor 
firms would favor tariffs while opposing import bans.  Thus, my model can explain the position of groups 
like ORIA and the FLA while Basu, Chau, and Grote’s cannot. 
 The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows.  Section 2 presents the simplest two firm 
production differentiation model.  Section 3 takes up the issue of charitable donations and tariffs.  Since 
there may be concerns that the results for production differentiation require the existence of only two 
firms, Section 4 demonstrates that similar results can be found in a setting with several firms.  Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2.  A Simple Model of Production Differentiation 
 To formalize the above argument, consider a market with two firms, labeled 1 and 2, which 
engage in Bertrand competition.5  Although the firms make products with identical physical 
                                                          
 5 The following analysis borrows heavily from the work on Bertrand competition with quality-
differentiated products as presented by Tirole (1988).  Although the model presented is extremely simple, 
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characteristics, they can produce their brand using either adult or child labor.6  Since the products are 
physically the same, the continuum of consumers derives the same baseline utilityθ regardless of the 
production method.  In addition to the baseline θ, consumers also consider the labor input when assigning 














if i purchases a product made with adult labor
- p if i purchases a product made with child labor
0 if no purchase is made.
    (1) 
where p is the price and γ i is a taste parameter which is distributed uniformly across consumers on the 
interval [1,γ ].   Thus, some consumers are indifferent between production methods, whereas others 
derive additional welfare from knowing that their product was made without child workers.  In Section 4, 
I extend consumer preferences to allow for both production method and brand differentiation.  For 
simplicity, no consumers prefer the use of child labor, although such preferences could easily be 
introduced and would cause no qualitative change in my results.  As suggested by Srinivasan (1996) and 
Maskus (1997) the additional value placed on adult labor products can be attributed to a “warm glow” 
that consumers get because they feel that they are helping underprivileged children (although as Basu, 
1999, discusses, such benefits may not actually occur).  While there is a tradition of such a warm glow in 
the child labor literature, has generally been attributed to the parents of child workers (see Galor and Zeira 
(1993) and Chiu (1998) for examples).7  The size of the consumer population is normalized to one and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
its generality is well-known.  Since my goal is not to expound upon the generality of those results but 
rather to illustrate why seemingly altruistic behavior may arise from profit-seeking, I proceed with what I 
feel is the clearest illustrative example. 
 6 Lutz, Lyon, and Maxwell (2000) used a similar approach to question why some firms exceed 
minimum environmental standards.  
 7 The warm glow has also been used in the public goods literature as an explanation for altruistic 
giving (Andrioni, 1990).   
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each consumer purchases at most one unit. Labor inputs are common knowledge and costless to verify, 
which avoids any incentive concerns.  Since the one primary goal of the FLA and the WRC is to monitor 
labor standards and make this information easily available to consumers, this assumption is not 
unreasonable.  Typically, this information is communicated to consumers through labeling, such as the 
RUGMARK program which certifies and labels hand-knotted carpets as “child labor free”.  RUGMARK 
also helps displaced child workers through small stipends and education program placement 
(Collingsworth, 1997).   
 The demand for each firm, Di(p1,p2,t1,t2) depends on the prices (p1, p2) and the type of labor (t1,t2) 
used by both.  If firm i uses adult labor, then ti = a.  If it uses child labor, then ti = c.  If both firms produce 
using the same method, consumers purchase whichever product is cheapest.  Thus, if both firms use child 
labor, for i=1, 2:  
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If both firms use adult labor, each firm faces the demand function: 
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Finally, consider the case where the firms use different labor types.  Without loss of generality, assume 
that firm 1 uses adult labor and firm 2 uses child labor.  Here, for given prices, there exists a consumer 
who is indifferent between the two products, yielding the demand functions (ignoring corner solutions for 
the moment): 









        (4) 
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and 
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Production is constant returns to scale.  The constant marginal cost of production when using adult 
workers is wa whereas the constant per unit cost when using child workers is wc, where wc < wa.  Note 
that these are per unit costs and do not necessarily correspond directly to wages.  As noted by Ranjan 
(2001), child workers are generally less productive than adult workers.  This alone can imply a lower 
wage for child workers.8   Two assumptions simplify the analysis: 
 Assumption 1: 2 1θ γ( ) .− > −w wa c  
 Assumption 2: θ θ γ> + + −w w
a c2 1
3
( ) . 
Assumption 1 puts an upper bound on the cost differential.  This ensures that the adult labor firm’s costs 
are not so much greater that it cannot compete with the lower cost firm.  This is consistent with the 
observed presence of both child and adult labor firms in practice.  The second assumption is sufficient to 
guarantee that the market is covered in the equilibrium, i.e. that all consumers will purchase one of the 
two firms’ product. 
 When the firms use the same type of labor, the equilibrium is the familiar Bertrand Paradox in 
which both firms set prices equal to the marginal cost and obtain zero profits.  Since this result is so well-
known, I omit its derivation. 












]p w p pa         (6) 
                                                          
 8 It is important to note that in Ranjan’s (2001) model, child workers receive an efficiency 
weighted fraction of the adult wage, implying that the unit cost of production is the same when using 
child or adult workers.  My assumption, however, not indicates a lower wage for child workers, but also 













p w p pc .        (7) 
Each firm maximizes its profits with respect to its own price.  The Nash equilibrium in the price-setting 
game is: 
 p w w
a c
1 2 2 1
3
=
+ + −θ γ( )         (8) 
and  





+ + −θ γ( ) .        (9) 
By Assumption 1, both prices exceed their marginal costs.  Furthermore,  




0− = − + − >θ γ( ) ,  
which indicates that firm 2 has positive demand.  Firm 1's positive sales are ensured by Assumption 2.  
Finally, equilibrium profits are: 
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a c        (11) 
These results are summarized in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition: Both firms’ profits are strictly higher when they use different labor types. 
 
 By using different types of labor, firms are able to differentiate between themselves.  In 
particular, although the firm’s products are identical physically, firms can exploit the fact that consumers 
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differentiate between them according to production methods.  Whether firms enter sequentially or 
simultaneously, the only pure strategy Nash equilibria are for one firm to service the high end of the 
market, i.e. the consumers with a strong preference for adult-labor products, and for the other firm to 
service the low end of the market by making inexpensive goods for highly price-sensitive consumers.  
Without placing additional structure on the model, it is impossible to say which end of the market a firm 
would prefer to serve since: 
 π π θ γ1 2 3 1 2
9
− =
− − −( ) ( )w wa c   
which even in light of Assumption 1 is ambiguous in sign.  Nevertheless, the results indicate that both 
firms gain by using different labor pools.  If Assumption 2 is relaxed, as long as both firms sell positive 
amounts when using different labor pools, profits will still be weakly greater with differentiation, 
although their expression is more complex. 
 An important implication of this result is that the firm which abstains from child labor would not 
be willing to back legislation banning the importation of child-labor goods.  Such a ban would lead the 
other firm to begin using adult labor, driving industry profits to zero.  By publicly committing to using 
different labor types, the firms are able to split the market implying that neither firm has an incentive to 
back such a ban.  Additionally, not all consumers would necessarily benefit from such legislation.  The 
consumers who purchase the adult-labor good in the differentiated product equilibrium would gain as the 
price for their purchase falls to wa, however those who were purchasing child-labor output can be harmed.  
Specifically, if  wa  > θ, banning child labor would drive consumers with weak preference for adult labor 
goods out of the market and make them worse off.  Finally, it is important to recognize that this result 
does not address the effect of legislation on the child workers themselves.  As noted by Basu (1999) in a 




3.  Charitable Donations and Tariffs 
 In this section, I use the production differentiation framework to analyze two additional items.  
First, I consider the practice in which adult labor firms make charitable donations to child welfare groups 
in locations where their competitors employ children.  Second, I consider the use of a tariff on child labor 
products instead of the outright ban called for by the Harkin Bill. 
3.1  Charitable Donations 
 There are two ways in which charitable donations fit into the above framework.  One method is to 
place the production differentiation story in a broader political economy model.  Suppose for example that 
the government will impose an import ban if the welfare of child workers falls below some minimum 
level.  Here, the industry may well find it desirable to use donations to raise the children’s welfare in 
order to head off an impending ban.  Thus, rather than contribute to politicians directly ala Grossman and 
Helpman (1994), firms may influence policy by donating to child welfare groups.  If this is the case, both 
adult and child labor firms might be expected to donate to charities.   
 An alternative approach in which only the adult labor firm donates is the case in which the cost of 
child labor production is affected by charity work.  This could arise from support for groups which push 
to increase the minimum wage for children, increase the length of mandatory schooling, or simply 
improve the quality and availability of schools.  According to Lansky (1997), “Compulsory education has 
historically proved one of the most effective instrument for eliminating child labor” (pg. 240).  This 
suggests that a firm may indeed be able to increase the unit cost of child labor production through 
donations to child welfare groups.  To consider this case, suppose that firm 1 announces its charitable 
giving, G, before prices are set.  Furthermore, suppose that the unit cost when using child labor is an 
increasing but concave function of G.9  For a given level of donations, the child-labor using firm 2's 
                                                          
 9 Although it may seem somewhat odd that donations have this effect while the employment level 
has no effect on wages, one can imagine that if donations lead to mandatory schooling this affects the 
entire pool of child workers of which firm 2 hires only a small portion.  Thus, firm 1's giving could be 
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Since G is announced before prices are set, the Nash equilibrium in prices remains the same, as does the 
solution for π2.  Firm 1's profits are now: 
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.        (12) 
Using a modified version of Assumption 1 to account for a variable unit cost when using children, this 
indicates that the adult-labor firm will donate as long as the cost of doing so is recouped through a 
sufficiently large effect on the child labor firm’s cost of production.10  It is also clear that in this case, the 
child-labor firm would never engage in such giving since this only increases its own costs.  However, 
whichever approach one chooses to take, charitable donations can arise not from the benevolence of 
firms, but as a result of profit-seeking.  
3.2  Tariffs 
 Rather than the ban on child labor products called for by the Child Labor Deterrence Act, an 
alternative protection measure is the use of a tariff against child labor products.  The imposition of a 
specific, per-unit tariff on imports from the child labor firm, is isomorphic to an increase in its unit cost of 
production wc.  Thus, just as shown for charitable donations, the imposition of a tariff can benefit the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
magnified through the political process giving it this unbalanced effect. Alternatively, I could introduce 
increasing marginal costs overall without qualitatively altering the results. 
 10 As a technical note, in order to ensure that the adult firm does not give away all of its profits, 
there must also be an upper limit on the benefit from charitable donations. 
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adult labor firm.  In fact, if I were to consider a political economy setting in which the tariff arises from 
lobbying, I would find a condition identical to (12) where the final term represents the cost of lobbying 
rather than the cost of donations.  A similar condition can be found for an ad-valorem tariff.  Thus, the 
production differentiation framework suggests that although the adult-labor firms may fight the Harkin 
Bill, they would favor tariffs against child-labor firms.  As discussed in the introduction, although the 
Harkin Bill has repeatedly failed, the Generalized System of Preferences has been used against countries 
that do not enforce “reasonable” labor standards.  Thus, while in the U.S. a ban on imports of child labor 
products has failed to materialize, the U.S. government has imposed tariffs on child labor products, just as 
the production differentiation story predicts.  Yanz and Jeffcott (1998) find a similar story in Canada, 
where although labor unions do not support a ban on child labor products, the unions have indicated that 
they would favor the use of tariffs.  Basu, Chau, and Grote (2000) find that the imposition of a tariff can 
either benefit or harm the adult labor firms in the importing country.  This is because in their model of 
price-taking producers a tariff can lead exporters to switch from child to adult labor without the dire 
consequences inherent to Bertrand competition. 
 
4.  Multiple Firms 
 One limitation of the simple model of Section 2 is that positive profits only arise in equilibrium 
when there two firms.  If a third firm were introduced, this would drive industry profits to zero even if 
child labor were permitted.  To see why, suppose that this third firm used child labor.  This then leads to 
severe price competition between firms 2 and 3, resulting in zero profits for the child labor sector.  This 
implies that one of the two firms would have an incentive to switch to adult labor and undercut the adult 
labor-using firm 1.  Thus, the only equilibrium is one in which all three firms earn zero profits.  However, 
there are two straightforward ways of extending the above model that again results in equilibria in which 
firms prefer to differentiate themselves through their production method.   The first way is to allow for an 
entirely child labor firm, and entirely adult labor firm, and an intermediate firm that uses some child and 
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some adult labor.  Just as in models in which consumers place varying values on high, medium, and low 
quality products, this would make it possible for each of the three firms to service a particular segment of 
the market and enjoy positive profits.  However, since I am unaware of any products carrying a label 
stating “made with very few child workers”, I do not feel that allowing for an intermediate type firm is the 
most satisfying way of incorporating three firms.11 
 Instead, consider a situation in which three firms are differentiated along two dimensions.  As 
above, firms can differ according to their production method by using either child or adult labor.  In 
addition, firms differ in their “brands”, described by an exogenous parameter bj = {0,1,2}.  I denote the 



















if i purchases a product made with adult labor from firm j
- p if i purchases a product made with child labor from firm j
0 if no purchase is made.
  (13) 
where δi is a consumer’s brand loyalty.  This parameter is distributed uniformly on the interval [0,2] and 
is independent of γi.  Thus, consumers are defined by their preference for adult labor products and their 
brand loyalty.  Under the uniform, independent distributions of δi and γi, I can represent the space of 
consumer types by a rectangle with length 2 and height γ −1 .  As before, the size of the population is 
normalized to 1.  Note that this representation of brand preference is the same as the well-known problem 
of horizontal or location differentiation (see Tirole, 1994 for details).  One feature of this parameterization 
is that with three firms and brand loyalty represented by a line, with endogenous brands the only Nash 
equilibrium involves mixed strategies for firm brand choice.  Since the point of this paper is to illustrate 
the importance of production differentiation instead of brand differentiation, I simply sidestep this 
problem by making brands exogenous.  While I could overcome this mixed strategy problem by assuming 
                                                          
 11 One situation where we do see such intermediate-type labeling is for recycled goods.  It is quite 
common to see products such as paper labeled with their specific percentage of post-consumer recycled 
content.  This recycled content ranges widely between brands and across percentages of recycled material. 
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that brand preferences are distributed on a circle instead of a line and endogenizing brand preference, this 
only adds complexity and does not change the intuition behind the use of child and adult labor.  
Therefore, rather than reinventing the wheel (quite literally in this case), I proceed using exogenous 
brands to highlight the role of production method differentiation.12 
 To follow the two firm case, first suppose that all three firms use the same type of labor, either 
child or adult.  When there is no distinction between firms in production methods, this plays no role in the 
consumer’s choice of which firm to buy from (assuming that a purchase will occur).  Instead, the 
consumer will simply weigh the price differentials between firms with their relative distance from the 
consumer’s brand preference parameter δi.  As before, I assume that the market is covered in equilibrium.  
This requires that θ > 5/4 + w
a.  Using the consumer’s choice problem, I can calculate the δs for which 
consumers are just indifferent between two firms.  Using this information and integrating across the 


















pppppD         (16) 
Note that because of the brand differentiation, these demands do not have the discontinuities found in the 
demand equations (2) or (3).  Because of this, positive equilibrium profits arise even if all three firms use 
the same production method.  Plugging these into the profit functions and taking the first order conditions 
yields the equilibrium prices: 
 wppp +=== 1210          (17) 
                                                          
 12 For an example of simultaneous vertical and horizontal product differentiation in which 
consumers types are located on a circle, see Degryse (1996) or Bester (1998).  Caplin and Nalebuff 
(1991) provide sufficient conditions for the existence of pure strategy equilibria when firms can 
differentiate themselves along multiple dimensions.  I merely impose these conditions. 
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where w = {wa, wc}.  This translates into equilibrium profits of: 
 Π0 = Π2 = .25 and Π1 = .5.        (18) 
The split of consumers among the three firms is illustrated in Figure 1.  There are three things to note 
about this equilibrium.  First, firm 1 enjoys higher profits since it is “closer” to more consumers.  Second, 
the equilibrium does not depend on consumers’ preferences for adult labor products.  In Figure 1, this is 
shown by the fact that the consumer preference for labor types γi does not influence the split of consumers 
among firms.  Finally, since the equilibrium profits do not depend on the unit cost, the same results arise 
for when all three firms use either labor type. 
 I now turn to a case in which the firms use different production methods.  Since my goal in this 
section is to demonstrate that the flavor of the above two firm analysis carries over into the three firm 
case, I assume that firm 1 uses child labor while firms 0 and 2 use adult labor.  I find similar results for 
the other combinations of adult and child labor across the three firms and these results are available upon 
request.  Since firms 0 and 2 both use adult labor, a consumer with a given γ is indifferent between them 
when her brand preference is equal to: 
 
~
δ = + −1
4
2 0p p           (19) 
Consumers with δδ ~≤ will choose between firms 0 and 1 while consumers with δδ ~≥ will choose 





− + −1 2 10 1p p .          (20) 




− − +1 2 32 1p p .        (21) 
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Note that I am assuming that prices are such that )2,0(~∈δ and that both γ~ and γ~  lie between 1 and 
.γ   If this is not true, then it is necessary to control for corners.  However, in the interest of minimizing 
notation, I ignore these difficulties assume that these conditions hold in equilibrium.  Using these ranges, 
I can write the demand functions of the two adult labor firms as: 
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Demand for the child labor-using firm 1 is: 
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Using these demand curves in the profit functions and taking the first order conditions, the following 
three equations are found: 
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where ( ) .))1(2(16)10)1(2( 2/12 acac wwww −+−−+−+−= γθγθλ  
These prices yield the split of consumers between firms illustrated in Figure 2.  Note that now the split 
between firms does depend on the preference for labor types.   
 Unfortunately, the quadratic introduced by the interaction between brand differentiation and 
production method differentiation makes a simple comparison of the profit levels with and without child 








λγθca ww        (30) 
and for the adult labor firms as: 
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It is easy to find parameter values for which Π0 = Π2 > .25 and Π1 = .5, that is, in which all firms get 
higher profits than the case in which they are unable to differentiate themselves through production 
method.13  The conditions under which this is true are more strict than those that simply ensure that the 
market is covered and that the consumers are split between the adult and child labor firms for all values of 
δ.  To find these conditions, simply impose the desired property and use (30) and (31) solve for the set of 
parameters for which this is true.  Since there is little value in the explicit derivation, I omit it here, but 
merely note that this requires that the gap between the adult cost and the child cost is sufficiently large 
relative to θ γ( )−1  but not so large that adult labor firms cannot profitably compete.  This need for a 
sufficiently large cost differential is so that the potential loss in demand for the child labor firm, that is the 
reduction in the space it captures between Figures 1 and 2, is not so large that it wipes out the gains from 
                                                          
 13 One example is to set { } { }2,4,1,2,,, =γθca ww . 
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having a higher markup.  In any case, while the three firm example does require additional restrictions on 
the parameters, it does illustrate that the desirability of production method differentiation is not reliant on 
the assumption of two firms.  Therefore, even with many firms, adult labor-using firms need not find it 
beneficial to eliminate the use of child labor.  
 Finally, we must consider the effect of entry on these results.  At first blush, one would imagine 
that entry would eliminate any gains from production differentiation in the long run.  This, however, need 
not be true.  The reason is that when an adult and a child labor firm are neighbors on the brand line, 
production differentiation gives the adult firm an incentive to keep its price high relative to the child labor 
firm in order to earn profits from the high γ consumers between them.  Because of this, the firm on the 
other side of the adult labor firm, regardless of the type of labor it uses, will be able to charge a higher 
equilibrium price than if there were no production differentiation.  As before, whether this production 
differentiation is enough to increase the profits of all firms depends on the parameters.  However, as long 
as there exist positive returns to brand differentiation in the long run, as would occur with an entry cost, 
even with entry adult labor firms may prefer to preserve the ability to use child labor.  If entry is free, then 
in the long run the gain from brand differentiation will be eliminated.  In this case, it is perhaps best to say 
that firms prefer production differentiation in the short run, but are indifferent to it in the long run. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 Although the above presentation is quite specific in functional form, the results are as general as 
the standard story of quality differentiation with product differentiation.  With more general cost 
structures, distribution of consumer types, or the elimination of Assumptions 1 and 2, the equilibrium 
may involve only one type of good being produced or only a portion of consumers purchasing.  Either 
way, the result remains that industry profits cannot be lower when firms have the ability to differentiate 
themselves through their production methods.  Furthermore, as long as there exists an equilibrium in 
which both adult and child labor firms produce, firms will prefer to use different labor pools in order to 
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increase profits.  The result is also robust if I allow for varying mixes of child and adult labor rather than 
the all-adult or all-child production methods considered above.  When consumers vary in how they value 
various combinations of adult and child labor, the equilibrium will involve one firm using relatively more 
adult labor than the other.  Again, the result is that firms enjoy higher equilibrium profits when they use 
different labor mixes.  Finally, rather than multiple firms the model can be reinterpreted as a single firm 
with multiple product lines.  Here, even though the various lines may be physically identical, the firm will 
segment the market by using differing production methods.  This gives it the ability to price-discriminate 
and increase profits. 
 This framework is not limited to the child labor issue.  Lutz, Lyon, and Maxwell (2000) use a 
similar approach to consider the environmental quality choice for firms.  They find that when consumers 
vary in their demand for environmentally-friendly products, firms adopt different production methods 
with one firm using a clean, expensive technology while the other uses a relatively polluting yet 
inexpensive production method.  They show that the introduction of a minimum quality standard has an 
effect analogous to that of the Child Labor Deterrence Act: both firms move towards a cleaner technology 
as industry profits fall.  This idea is borne out by Mouritsen, Ernst, and Jrrgensen’s (2000) findings.  
These authors surveyed eleven Danish firms who voluntarily submit themselves to the British Standard 
7750, which is a certification that a particular firm has established and follows a set of environmental 
protection measures.  The responses show that one of the primary reasons firms do so is to give them a 
competitive edge.  In fact, one clothing producer said that it “adopted a differentiation strategy and its 
goal was to produce the ‘greenest’ product in the market.  Price competition from East Europe and East 
Asia was hard, and this firm attempted to compete with good quality and environment-friendly products” 
(pg. 178).  This is exactly the type of production differentiation I discuss, and survey evidence indicate 
that this is an important issue for consumers.  Consider Brott and Ash (2001) who report that 61 percent 
of American consumers say that they would rather buy environmentally friendly products.  Furthermore, 
42 percent reported that they had tried a new product because they felt the product, its packaging, or the 
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manufacturer benefited the environment.  Other instances in which consumers are willing to pay more for 
a virtually identical product because of the way it is produced are readily found.  In the cosmetics 
industry, there is an active market for “cruelty-free” cosmetics because some consumers are willing to pay 
a premium to know that their cosmetics are not tested on animals.  In agriculture, some consumers are 
willing to pay more for free-range meat because the animals lead a more pleasant, free-roaming life 
before slaughter.  Finally, the cachet for hand-made or ethnic items cannot be denied even though they 
may be indistinguishable from their manufactured or domestic counterparts.  Even domestic products can 
exploit this as evidenced by the successful “Made in America” campaign.  In all of these situations firms 
are able to create niche markets based on the fact that some consumers are willing to pay more for an 
otherwise identical product simply because they prefer the manner in which it was made.  
 Recognizing that a product’s production method matters to consumers has important implications 
for the World Trade Organization.  In Article 2.8 of the WTO’s Agreement on Technical Barriers to trade, 
the WTO rules that “wherever appropriate, members shall specify technical regulations based on product 
requirements in terms of performance rather than design or descriptive characteristics” (pg. 119, 1994).  
This “product” versus “process” regulation is especially infamous due to the dispute between the U.S. and 
Mexico regarding Mexican tuna exports.  Because of the nets used by Mexican fishers, a large number of 
dolphins were inadvertently killed as they harvested tuna.  The U.S. claimed that under the U.S. Marine 
Mammal Protection Act this environmental damage warranted an embargo against Mexican tuna.  In 
response, Mexico filed a formal complaint to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1991.  
Although the GATT never officially ruled, it is generally presumed that it would have agreed with the 
Mexican complaint since the dolphin deaths would have been part of the production of the product rather 
than its performance.  One might expect that the Child Labor Deterrence Act would face similar 
difficulties under the WTO.  In fact, the WTO openly discourages using trade sanctions to achieve labor 
market results, preferring to defer this issue to the International Labor Organization (World Trade 
Organization, 1999).  However, if one is willing to extend the definition of “performance” to include 
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customer satisfaction with the production method, this opens up a broad set of regulations that would be 
permissible by the WTO.  While such a broadening might be hailed by critics of the WTO, it might also 
lead to a flood of protection disguised as product performance regulations.  This could result in problems 
similar to the alleged abuses of the WTO’s anti-dumping provisions.14  Nevertheless, it is important to 
recognize the potential implications of this broader notion of product performance on trade policy. 
 In summary, I have presented one possible explanation for why firms may voluntarily abstain 
from child labor yet refrain from requiring that all firms do so.  Furthermore, this framework can also 
explain charitable giving by firms as the result of profit-seeking, not altruism.  While I do not intend to 
imply that all such acts are completely self-serving, my results do cast these actions in a different light.  It 
is critical that researchers understand the incentives that drive firms’ choice of production method if they 
hope to anticipate how they will respond to government policies.  Therefore, I hope that this simple 













                                                          
 14 Hindley and Messerlin (1996) provide an in-depth look at protectionism and anti-dumping. 
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